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1. Introduction 
The 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections were 
among the most contested in the history of the Euro-
pean Union. Never before were elites and citizens so di-
vided on EU questions and never before were anti-EU 
sentiments so strong. For a long time European integra-
tion was considered a consensus topic (Hooghe & 
Marks, 2005) and EU attitudes were seen as uni-dimen-
sional. This made intuitive sense during a period where 
European integration was rarely politicized and the EU 
did not feature centrally in political or public debates. Re-
cent work in the field, however, demonstrated that these 
attitudes contain multiple dimensions (Hobolt, 2014). 
Boomgaarden, Schuck, Elenbaas and de Vreese (2011) 
identified five dimensions dealing with (1) the identifica-
tion with Europe, (2) evaluations of potential benefits of 
the EU, (3) evaluations of the current (democratic) per-
formance of the EU, (4) the emotional component of at-
titudes towards the EU, and finally (5) a more ideological 
attitude towards EU integration. This dimensional struc-
ture has been validated and the importance of these di-
mensions for voting behaviour in EP elections has been 
demonstrated (van Spanje & de Vreese, 2014). 
In this paper we focus in particular on the perfor-
mance dimension of EU attitudes. The perceived perfor-
mance of the European Union and its institutions is 
highly relevant in relation to elections where citizens are 
asked to vote for one of the key institutions, because it 
is one of the most important criteria voters apply in or-
der to make their voting decisions. Indeed a rich litera-
ture has shown that citizens are capable of evaluating 
the performance of their elected officials, also in the 
context of EU politics (Tilley & Hobolt, 2011). Moreover, 
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performance evaluations are a key component of citi-
zens’ general evaluations of EU politics (de Vreese & van 
der Brug, 2016).  
In this study, we first look at how this dimension of 
EU attitudes has developed at the aggregate level since 
2009. Second, we turn to the individual level and inves-
tigate the role played by the news media in shaping pub-
lic opinion about EU performance by linking citizens’ 
evaluations across time to the news media content they 
were exposed to. Using multiple wave panel survey data 
and a media content analysis, the central question is if 
exposure to news about the performance of the EU af-
fects change in individual level attitudes.  
Understanding these dynamics is important, both 
from a theoretical point of view of trying to understand 
the role of new information in shaping EU attitudes as 
well as from a societal point of view, as the EU is a polit-
ical reality that has been very prominent in past years’ 
politics. But this increase in prominence was paralleled 
by an increase in the contentiousness of the EU, and the 
obviousness of the EU is not undisputed. Understanding 
support for the EU is important for the legitimacy (or il-
legitimacy) of the EU as a democratic system. Further-
more these findings may help us in understanding citi-
zens’ decisions to vote for pro-European or Eurosceptic 
parties (see Treib, 2014; van Spanje & de Vreese, 2014). 
In the long run EU attitudes and voting based on EU con-
siderations may affect not only the direction in which 
the EU is heading, but also national political choices (de 
Vries, 2007). 
2. EU Attitudes: Multiple Dimensions 
The EU today covers more policy areas and more geo-
graphical space than ever before. As argued in detail 
elsewhere, there are very good theoretical and empiri-
cal reasons to consider EU attitudes as multidimen-
sional. In general, political support can be directed to-
wards different objects of support (Easton, 1975), can 
be diffuse or specific (Gabel, 1998; Hewstone, 1986), or 
can be of a utilitarian or affective nature (Lindberg & 
Scheingold, 1970). Recent research identified five di-
mensions of EU attitudes: negative affection, identity, 
performance, utilitarianism, and strengthening.  
The first dimension, negative affection towards the 
EU, touches on a perceived threat of European unifica-
tion. The second dimension, identity, encompasses atti-
tudes specific to citizens’ identification with the EU, 
such as pride in being an EU citizen and feeling close to 
other Europeans and their culture and history, but also 
adherence to EU symbols such as the flag. The third di-
mension relates to the democratic and financial func-
tioning and the performance of European institutions, 
and is labelled ‘performance’ (of the EU). The fourth di-
mension, utility, entails traditional general support as 
well as the perception of the country’s and the individ-
ual’s personal benefit as a result of EU membership, and 
attitudes in line with post-materialist utilitarian ap-
proach to European integration in terms of the EU help-
ing to preserve peace, prosperity and the environment. 
The fifth dimension called (EU) ‘strengthening’ entails 
attitudes towards the future of European integration 
and to a process of further deepening and widening of 
the EU. Within this multi-dimensional structure some 
sub-dimensions are more stable than others. Identity, 
for example, is conceptually close to being a character 
trait, while performance evaluations are more likely to 
fluctuate over time, as the actual performance of the EU 
is not stable itself. More importantly, mediated infor-
mation about the performance of the EU varies substan-
tially across time, depending on issue cycles and the 
larger political agenda, as well as the functioning of the 
EU institutions. For this reason and given the im-
portance of this attitude dimension in electoral deci-
sion-making, we study performance evaluation as an 
outcome of exposure to EU news in detail. 
3. Doing Well? EU Performance Evaluations 
In the run up to elections it is essential that citizens form 
evaluations about the performance of power holders, 
policies, and institutions. As convincingly pointed out by 
Hobolt (2012), though there is a rich academic literature 
on how EU institutions function and how they could be 
designed to alleviate the alleged ‘democratic deficit’ in 
the EU, we still have only limited knowledge about how 
citizens view European democracy. Previous research 
has demonstrated that there is a lot of cross-national 
and individual level variation in citizens’ evaluations of 
the democratic performance of the EU (e.g., Desmet, 
van Spanje, & de Vreese, 2012). In a general sense, Al-
varez and Franklin (1994) argued that how people see 
the performance of a regime depends on the cost-ben-
efit assessments people make. These assessments may 
pertain to evaluations of political performance (Klinge-
mann & Fuchs, 1995; Rose & Mishler, 2002), economic 
performance (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Lewis-Beck, 
1988), and expectations of governance in the near fu-
ture (Stokes, 2001). 
The EU performance evaluations as part of the 
broader EU attitude structure are important because 
they concern the perception and evaluation of the ac-
tual functioning of the systems and its institutions. In 
line with Rohrschneider (2002), Scheuer (2005), and 
Boomgaarden et al. (2011), Desmet et al. (2012) found 
that citizens do not per se connect their evaluations of 
the EU’s democratic performance with their political 
support for further integration, i.e. these are relatively 
independent attitude dimensions. That said, perfor-
mance evaluations matter for future support as they are 
building blocks for these latter, more general attitudes, 
and they are, as such, crucial considerations in the pro-
cess of EU opinion formation (Sanchez-Cuenca, 2000; 
Rohrschneider, 2002).  
 Politics and Governance, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 1, Pages 69-82 71 
Most prior research focusing on the EU’s perfor-
mance has relied on a single item tapping satisfaction 
with the way democracy works. This has been investi-
gated both in general cross-national terms (e.g., Norris, 
1999) and with respect to the EU specifically (Karp, Ban-
ducci, & Bowler, 2003). Hobolt (2012) succinctly sum-
marizes that in the “EU context, scholars have argued 
that whereas input-oriented and output-oriented legiti-
macy coexist in democratic nation-states, support for 
democracy in the EU must rely solely on output-based 
legitimacy (see, for example, Majone, 1998, 2000)”. As 
Scharpf (1999, p. 12) notes: ‘[T]he legitimacy of [the 
EU’s] institutional practices…is almost automatically 
judged, and found wanting, by reference to the con-
glomerate of input- and output-oriented criteria familiar 
from national debates’. As put by Hobolt (2012): “since 
the EU lacks a single demos with a collective identity, the 
legitimacy of the Union hinges almost exclusively on its 
performance (Scharpf, 1999; Majone, 2000)”. This makes 
the performance dimension of EU attitudes crucial. 
4. Explaining Change in EU Performance Evaluations 
As a general antecedent of EU performance evaluations 
we know that economic considerations and government 
approval matter (the so-called national yardstick, see 
Boomgaarden et al., 2011; Desmet et al., 2012; Hobolt, 
2012). However, since we, in this study, are concerned 
with changes in performance evaluations, we focus in 
particular on one of the key antecedents for changing 
opinions, the role of information as provided by the me-
dia. Research has generally not paid much attention to 
how media may affect citizens’ assessment of the dem-
ocratic performance of a polity like the EU (see Desmet, 
van Spanje, & de Vreese, 2015, for an exception). This 
might be surprising since we know from other studies 
that being exposed to specific media coverage can alter 
perceptions and support for different EU issues (e.g., 
Azrout, van Spanje, & de Vreese, 2012; de Vreese & 
Boomgaarden, 2016; Maier & Rittberger, 2008).  
The functioning of the EU is an issue where most cit-
izens rely on others’ judgment—in lieu of direct, per-
sonal experiences. In the words of Desmet et al. (2015, 
p. 3179): “Because European citizens do not experience 
the democratic performance of the EU first-hand, eval-
uations of the democratic performance of the EU de-
pend on collective experiences, and therefore on infor-
mation gathered through interpersonal and mass media 
communication”. We theorize that specific aspects of 
the media coverage are most likely to affect perfor-
mance evaluations, namely visibility of the EU and eval-
uations of the EU by actors in the news or the editorial 
board (de Vreese, Banducci, Semetko, & Boomgaarden, 
2006; Hopmann, Vliegenthart, De Vreese, & Albæk, 
                                                          
1 Fieldwork dates were 13th–26th of December, 2013 for the first 
wave, 20th–30th of March, 2014 for the second wave, 17th–28th 
2010). Visibility refers to how often the EU or its institu-
tions and actions are in the news. The visibility has tra-
ditionally been low to modest but with significant cross-
national variation (e.g., de Vreese et al., 2006). The sup-
ply of information is a condition sine qua non speculat-
ing about media effects stemming from news coverage 
makes little sense. In addition, specific features of the 
coverage, evaluations of the EU in general and, in par-
ticular, evaluation of the democratic performance of the 
EU, and the quality/effectiveness of the policies of the 
EU are expected to affect evaluations. Because these 
evaluations provide a frame of reference to news users 
that they can apply when they make up their mind about 
the performance of the EU. Based on extant research 
our key hypothesis is that exposure to news with explicit 
evaluations is likely to cause change in EU performance 
evaluation. We address this by estimating the impact of 
both news visibility and evaluations on change in evalu-
ations, and we also assess the magnitude of these ef-
fects by offering insights into what would happen with 
evaluations if either the news content or the news usage 
of individuals would change.  
5. Methods 
To test our hypothesis we rely on two original sources 
of data: a national four-wave panel survey and a media 
content analysis. Our study is conducted in the Nether-
lands. This country was long seen as a stable supporter 
of further integration, but public opinion has changed 
and the Dutch voted no to the Constitutional Treaty in a 
referendum in 2005 and in EP elections in both 2009 and 
2014, Eurosceptic parties gained a significant share of 
the vote. This makes the Netherlands an interesting case 
to investigate further. Ideally, our research would have 
allowed us to collect multiple wave survey data and me-
dia data in more countries, but in the absence of this op-
portunity we also stress that our key concern is to test 
the dynamics of media influence on public evaluations. 
We are more concerned with the nature of this dynamic 
than with the actual level of support, and we have little 
reason to expect that the dynamic would be different in 
a different context.  
5.1. Survey 
A four-wave panel survey was held in the Netherlands, 
with waves in December 2013 and March, April, and 
May 2014.1 It is part of the ‘2014 European Election 
Campaign Study’ (de Vreese, Azrout, & Möller, 2014). 
The fieldwork was coordinated by TNS NIPO Nether-
lands, a research institute that complies with ESOMAR 
guidelines for survey research. The sample was drawn 
from the TNS NIPO database. The database consists of 
of April, 2014 for the third wave, and 26th of May–2nd of June, 
2014 for the fourth wave. 
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200,000 individuals that were recruited through multi-
ple recruitment strategies, including telephone, face-to-
face, and online recruitment. Quotas (on age, gender, 
and education) were enforced in sampling from the da-
tabase. The survey was conducted using Computer As-
sisted Web Interviewing (CAWI). A total of 2189 re-
spondents participated in wave one (response rate 
78.1%), 1819 respondents participated in wave two (re-
contact rate 83.1%), 1537 participated in wave three 
(re-contact rate 84.5%), and 1379 in wave four (re-con-
tact rate 89.7%).  
5.2. Content Analysis 
Visibility and evaluations of the EU in the media were 
measured in a quantitative media content analysis of 
three daily newspapers (two quality newspapers [NRC 
Handelsblad and De Volkskrant] and one tabloid [De 
Telegraaf]), two television news programs (one from the 
public broadcaster [NOS Journaal] and one from a com-
mercial broadcaster [RTL Nieuws]) and one widely read 
online news source (nu.nl).2 We sampled the news from 
December 2nd, 2013 until May 21st, 2014 (the day before 
the EP Election Day). For the period before the EPE cam-
paign period (until April 16th) every outlet was coded 
every 3rd day, according to an alternating scheme (so 
each time a particular outlet would not be coded on a 
particular day of the week); during the campaign period, 
all outlets were coded every day. 
For the newspapers, every article on the front page 
and on a random page was coded. In addition, during 
the campaign period, for every other newspaper, coders 
would also code all articles on the domestic and inter-
national (foreign) news pages that mentioned the EU (or 
its institutions or the EP elections) at least twice. In the 
period before the campaign, coders coded all articles 
mentioning the EU twice for each newspaper in our 
sample. For television news all stories were coded, with 
the exception of the weather forecast and specific sec-
tions devoted to sports.  
For the online source, the sampling strategy was 
similar to the one used for the newspapers. Since the 
                                                          
2 We chose these outlets because they are the most used news 
media in their respective categories, and together they give a 
good representation of the Dutch media environment. More 
specifically we focus on a combination of national television 
news and newspapers, because these media are consistently 
listed as the most important sources of information about the 
EU for citizens in Europe (Eurobarometer 54–62). We first in-
cluded the main national evening news broadcasts of the most 
widely watched public (NOS Journaal) and commercial (RTL 
Nieuws) television stations. Second we included three newspa-
pers: De Telegraaf is the most read national newspaper with a 
sensationalist character; De Volkskrant and NRC Handelsblad 
are the most read quality newspapers, with the first having a 
front page of online news is unique for every user visit-
ing the site at a specific point in time and it is therefore 
impossible to ascertain which articles were available to 
respondents in the survey,3 we opted for using the arti-
cles classified as “most read” as an approximation. For 
the random page, for each day the website was coded so 
that a random sample of the published articles in the do-
mestic and foreign news was chosen as being part of the 
random page. This sampling strategy led to 4643 articles 
coded in 68 editions of each newspaper, 80 broadcasts of 
each television news program, and 80 days of the online 
news source (a total of 444 date-outlet combinations). 
Coding was performed by ten recruited and trained 
student coders. The coders participated in a joint train-
ing with fellow coders. The EU performance variable 
was part of the Dutch coding. After the training, inter-
coder reliability was assessed using a none-random 
sample of articles from English newspapers to test the 
variables coded EU wide (N=16), and a non-random 
sample of articles from Dutch newspapers to test the 
Dutch specific variables (N=11). The articles were cho-
sen such that there would be some spread on all varia-
bles. The results of the inter-coder reliability test are 
shown in Table A in the Appendix and fall within conven-
tional ICR standards (Riffe, Lacy, & Fico, 1998). 
5.2.1. Content Analysis Measures 
Visibility was assessed by coders coding whether the EU 
or its institutions were mentioned in the article (no = 0; 
yes = 1). Visibility for a particular outlet and a particular 
period was calculated as the proportion of all articles in 
that period for that outlet. As for newspapers there was 
an oversampling of stories mentioning the EU, the pro-
portion was only calculated for articles on the front page 
and the random page (as a random sample of the news).  
EU evaluation was assessed by coding the number of 
positive and negative evaluative statements in each ar-
ticle. We coded evaluative statements about the EU as 
a whole (i.e., as a political institution) and not about spe-
cific institutions (as for instance the European Commis-
sion or the European Parliament). If the number of neg-
ative evaluations exceeded the number of positive 
more left-of-centre ideology and the second being right-of-cen-
tre. Since citizens retrieve their news more and more online, we 
also added the most widely used online news website: 
www.nu.nl 
3 We did not consider the homepage of the news website as a 
front page, because online news sites do not have a unique daily 
homepage. The homepage is constantly changing and is also ad-
justed to personal preferences of the site’s visitor by the use of 
cookies. And on a more practical note, the homepage of nu.nl 
lists at any given moment more than 60 titles of the most recent 
published articles, which should not be considered as front page 
material in terms of the importance of the news and also given 
that this is too high a number of articles compared to the front 
page of a physical newspapers. 
 Politics and Governance, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 1, Pages 69-82 73 
evaluations, EU evaluation was coded as -1; if the num-
ber of positive evaluations exceeded the number of neg-
ative evaluations, EU evaluation was coded as +1; if the 
number of positive and negative evaluations was equal 
(or if there were no evaluations) EU evaluation was 
coded as 0. Similar to visibility, EU evaluation for a par-
ticular outlet and a particular period was calculated as 
the mean of all articles in that period for that outlet. The 
oversampling of EU articles here does not affect the ran-
domness of the sample, because all articles concerning 
the EU were selected to code on randomly selected 
days. Thus, the mean is calculated across all articles 
mentioning the EU. 
EU performance evaluation was assessed by coding 
references to the current performance of the EU. These 
references could be about the democratic performance 
of the EU, and about the quality/effectiveness of the 
policies of the EU. In contrast to our measure of EU eval-
uations, here we also coded evaluations of the perfor-
mance of specific EU institutions. EU performance eval-
uations were coded -1, 0 or +1 in the same way as with 
the general EU evaluation.  
5.2.2. Survey Measures 
To measure the different dimensions of EU attitudes, re-
spondents were asked in each wave to self-assess their 
agreement, on a 7 point scale, to a multiple item scale. 
EU performance was measured with three items: (1) The 
European Union functions well as it is, (2) the European 
Union functions according to democratic principles, and 
(3) the decision-making process in the European Union 
is transparent. Cronbach’s alpha ranged from .86 to .88 
in the four waves. 
Media exposure was assessed by asking respondents 
on how many days in a typical week did they watched or 
read each of the outlets. To measure exposure to the EU 
and to evaluations of the EU, we weighted the media 
exposure measure. For this, we used the visibility and 
evaluation scores from the content analysis. For each 
wave of the survey, we assessed for each outlet how vis-
ible the EU was and how it was evaluated between the 
waves. We linked media visibility to individual respond-
ents by multiplying the visibility scores for each period-
outlet combination to the self-reported exposure to 
                                                          
4 For each wave the EU visibility exposure measure (X1) is calcu-
lated by weighting the media exposure measure using the fol-
lowing equation: 
𝑋1𝑖,𝑡 = ∑𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗,𝑡
𝑗
 
With exposurei,j,t the number of days respondent i reports to use 
outlet j in a typical week at time point t, and visibilityj,t the mean 
visibility of the EU in outlet j in the period preceding time point t. 
that outlet in the consecutive wave of the survey. For 
evaluation exposure we followed a similar method.4 
Combining media content data with (panel) survey data 
is seen as one of the strongest designs for assessing me-
dia effects in observational studies (Schuck, 
Vliegenthart, & de Vreese, 2016; Slater, 2004, 2015). 
A number of control variables were included in the 
model. To test whether it is mere media exposure or 
whether exposure to specific content has an effect 
above and beyond, we added a “raw” media exposure 
measure, adding together the number of days respond-
ents use each of the media outlets used in this study. 
The descriptive measures of this variable and all addi-
tional variables can be found in Table B in the Appendix. 
Additional control variables include two measures of in-
terest, the first measuring general interest in the EU and 
the second measuring individual interest in the election 
campaign for the EP elections specifically. Also, we 
added two measures of interpersonal communication: 
Interpersonal communication about politics and inter-
personal communication about the EU as covariates to 
the model. Finally, we added satisfaction with the cur-
rent government and respondents evaluations of the 
economy. All items were measured on a seven-point 
scale and measured at the same time as the dependent 
and independent variable (see Table B in the Appendix 
for question wording). 
6. Results 
6.1. Descriptives of Public Opinion Development 
In Figure 1 the mean values (with 95% confidence inter-
val) of the EU performance evaluations are plotted over 
time starting in April 2009 (just before the previous EP 
elections of 2009); the subsequent four time points rep-
resent the four waves of our survey. This finding dove-
tails a more general pattern showing that since 2009, 
Dutch citizens have become more negative in their 
views regarding the EU (De Vreese, Azrout, & Moeller, 
in press). The drop in the performance dimension (with 
an aggregate level .6 drop on a 7-point scale) is the larg-
est when compared to other attitude dimensions. A for-
mal test showed that the difference was significant (p < 
.001). 
Similar, we calculated the EU evaluation exposure measure (X2) 
using the formula: 
𝑋2𝑖 = ∑𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑗 ∗ 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗
𝑗
 
With j representing the different media outlets, exposurei,j the 
number of days respondent i reports to use outlet j in a typical 
week, and evaluationj the mean evaluation of the EU in outlet j 
in the period preceding the wave. 
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Figure 1. Mean values of EU performance evaluation by the public over time, with the 95% confidence interval. 
 
Figure 2. Over time visibility as a proportion of the number of articles mentioning the EU on the front page and the 
random pages. Note: To smooth out the graph, we used a moving average of 4 weeks. The dashed lines represent the 
95% confidence interval. 
6.2. Descriptives Media Coverage 
In order to understand the dynamic relationship of me-
dia coverage and attitude formation it is useful to de-
scribe the development over time in media coverage 
and attitude formation separately. With regard to media 
coverage two characteristics are of importance in this 
study: visibility and evaluation. 
6.2.1. EU Visibility 
Figure 2 shows how visible the EU was over time be-
tween December 2013 and the elections in 2014 (taking 
all outlets together). The EU was least visible in January 
2015 (less than 2% of the news coverage). The visibility 
of the EU steadily increases over time, but drops again a 
little in April of that same year, and increases again as 
the June elections draw nearer. Comparing the different 
outlets (see Figure 3), we see substantial differences in 
EU visibility across the different newspapers. In particu-
lar, the tabloid (de Telegraaf) and television news pro-
grams (public and commercial) score lowest in EU visi-
bility. The online news source nu.nl scores highest in our 
analysis, but this is likely due to different sampling strat-
egies. 
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Figure 3. Visibility per news outlet, as the proportion of articles mentioning the EU on the front page and the random 
page (including the 95% confidence interval). 
 
Figure 4. Average EU evaluations over time. Note: The left axis represents values of EU evaluations, with the black solid 
line representing the mean evaluation over time (and the dashed line representing the 95% confidence interval). To 
smooth out the line, we used a moving average of 4 weeks. The grey line represents the number of news stories each 
week, with the scale shown on the right axis (no moving average). 
6.2.2. EU and Performance Evaluations 
Figure 4 shows the development of EU evaluations over 
time. Our results indicate that the general EU evaluation 
is, on average, always a negative evaluation. Yet, evalu-
ations are generally close to zero and with the exception 
of the final month, the 95% confidence interval includes 
the neutral value. But we should note that, given the 
number of coded articles about the EU in each week, this 
is most likely due to insufficient statistical power. In a sim-
ilar fashion, the negative peaks observed in January are 
likely the result of the small number of articles (consider-
ing the low visibility of the EU in January), whereby a few 
extreme articles have substantial influence. 
Plotted in Figure 5, the performance indicator also 
shows that evaluations are, on average, negative over 
the entire period, only reaching statistical significance at 
the end of our sampling period (this again is likely due 
to a lack of statistical power). Also, positive (February) 
and negative peaks (April) are the result of limited cov-
erage in the weeks before, with “extreme” performance 
evaluations. EU evaluations also differed across news 
outlets (see Figure 6). General EU evaluations were 
most negative in tabloid newspapers (De Telegraaf), 
while nu.nl (the online news source) is the least nega-
tive. These differences are, however, small and not sig-
nificant. But we do observe that all outlets show on av-
erage (minor) negative evaluations. 
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Figure 5. Average performance evaluations over time. Note: The left axis represents values of EU performance evalua-
tions, with the black solid line representing the mean evaluation over time (and the dashed line representing the 95% 
confidence interval). To smooth out the line, we used a moving average of 4 weeks. The grey line represents the number 
of news stories each week, with the scale shown on the right axis (no moving average). 
 
Figure 6. EU and performance evaluations per news outlet. Note: The darker grey bars represent EU evaluations and the 
lighter grey bars represent performance evaluations, with the middle of the bar representing the mean per outlet and 
the length of the bar representing the 95% confidence interval. The bars at the bottom represent the number of news 
stories the mean is based on. 
A similar pattern emerges for performance evaluations, 
however in this case De Volkskrant is found to be the 
most negative and RTL Nieuws the least negative. How-
ever, we need to note that many of these more detailed 
results are calculated on the basis of a very small set of 
articles that featured performance evaluations. For ex-
ample, RTL Nieuws’ coverage of the EU featured only 3 
stories in 6 months that mentioned EU performance. Sim-
ilar to the general EU evaluations, performance had an 
overall (though minor) negative evaluation, with no sig-
nificant differences between newspapers. 
6.3. Explanatory Analyses of EU Performance Dimension 
We now turn to analysing factors influencing change in 
EU performance evaluations of Dutch citizens using 
multi-level panel modelling, in particular the influence 
of media exposure to stories about the EU and evalua-
tions of the EU and its performance. Table 1 shows the 
results of predicting change in EU performance evalua-
tions using fixed effects modelling. We use a fixed ef-
fects model to explain within-subject change in the de-
pendent variable with within-subject change in the 
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independent variables, i.e., we compare each respond-
ent with him/herself at an earlier time point (e.g., Alli-
son, 2009). The advantage of this approach is that the 
models implicitly control for all time-invariant factors 
like gender or stable character traits and thus do not 
need to be added to the models. Additionally, we con-
trol for interest in the EU and the EP elections campaign, 
interpersonal communication, government satisfaction 
and economic evaluations, as these are both likely to 
change over time and are likely related to both media 
exposure and EU performance evaluations. 
The first model in Table 1 is a baseline model, with 
all the controls added but without weighted media ex-
posure measures. We observe that raw news exposure 
has a significant negative effect on EU performance 
evaluations (b = -0.010, se = 0.001, p < .001). Adding EU 
performance exposure (see model 2) significantly im-
proves the model (χ2(df=1) = 5.987, p = .014) and we find 
a positive significant effect of EU performance exposure 
(b = 0.241, se = 0.099, p = .014). Thus, more exposure to 
EU performance in the news leads to a more positive 
evaluation of EU performance. 
To give a more substantial interpretation, we need 
to consider that the EU performance exposure variable 
can vary by change in amount of media used by an indi-
vidual and by change in the amount of coverage about 
EU performance in each outlet. To illustrate the different 
impact of media coverage and media use, we plotted 
the expected change in EU performance evaluations 
against change in media use and change in media con-
tent in the two panels of Figure 7. 
In the first panel of Figure 7, we show the predicted 
change in EU performance evaluations when media use 
exposure changes while keeping measures of media 
content constant. Because the impact of increase in me-
dia use also depends on the amount of coverage on EU 
performance, we added three lines to the graph, indi-
cating the impact when frequency of media coverage is 
held constant at the mean (the solid line), the mean mi-
nus one standard deviation (the dotted line), and the 
mean plus the standard deviation (the dashed line). The 
first panel thus shows that when average news users in-
crease their use of a media outlet by one standard devi-
ation, our model predicts a positive change in EU perfor-
mance evaluations of 0.026. Yet, we need to consider 
that this is the predicted impact of change in use of one 
Table 1. Fixed effects models explaining EU performance attitudes using exposure to EU performance visibility and eval-
uation in the media. 
 1 2 3 4 
Intercept 0.018 
(0.068) 
0.043 
(0.069) 
0.022 
(0.069) 
0.043 
(0.069) 
Wave 2 0.067* 
(0.031) 
0.074* 
(0.031) 
0.060+ 
(0.035) 
0.073* 
(0.035) 
Wave 3 0.054+ 
(0.030) 
0.055+ 
(0.030) 
0.047 
(0.034) 
0.054 
(0.034) 
Wave 4 0.006 
(0.025) 
-0.043 
(0.032) 
0.001 
(0.027) 
-0.044 
(0.033) 
Raw news exposure -0.010*** 
(0.002) 
-0.012*** 
(0.003) 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
-0.012*** 
(0.003) 
Interest EU 0.075*** 
(0.010) 
0.075*** 
(0.010) 
0.075*** 
(0.010) 
0.075*** 
(0.010) 
Interest EPE campaign 0.037*** 
(0.009) 
0.036*** 
(0.009) 
0.037*** 
(0.009) 
0.036*** 
(0.009) 
IPC politics -0.032** 
(0.012) 
-0.033** 
(0.012) 
-0.032** 
(0.012) 
-0.033** 
(0.012) 
IPC EU -0.001 
(0.013) 
-0.001 
(0.013) 
-0.001 
(0.013) 
-0.001 
(0.013) 
Government satisfaction 0.297*** 
(0.015) 
0.296*** 
(0.015) 
0.297*** 
(0.015) 
0.296*** 
(0.015) 
Economic evaluations 0.214*** 
(0.016) 
0.213*** 
(0.016) 
0.215*** 
(0.016) 
0.213*** 
(0.016) 
Exposure performance visibility  0.241* 
(0.099) 
 0.241* 
(0.100) 
Exposure performance tone     -0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.000 
(0.004) 
-2LL 17465.821 17459.834 17465.584 17459.833 
AIC 17491.821 17487.834 17493.584 17489.833 
Note: Coefficients are based on ML estimation, with standard errors in parentheses. N = 2189.*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p 
< .05; + p < .1. 
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Figure 7. The graphs represent the expected change in EU performance evaluations based on the model. In the left panel, 
the expected change is shown while keeping the media content constant (represented by the three different lines, keep-
ing the media constant at three different levels) and by change in standard deviations in media use (represented in the 
x-axis). In the right panel, media use is kept constant, while varying EU visibility in the media content. 
average media outlet. If a respondent would increase 
his/her use of all media outlets by one standard devia-
tion, the model predicts an increase in EU performance 
evaluations of 0.157. 
In the second panel of Figure 7 we show the pre-
dicted change in EU evaluations by change in media con-
tent, while keeping measures of media use constant. 
The graph shows that if a media outlet started to feature 
one standard deviation more coverage of the EU, aver-
age users of that outlet are predicted to move 0.067 
item steps towards positive performance evaluations. 
Again this is quite a modest change, but for a heavy user 
(plus one standard deviation), the model predicts a 
change of .109; and if all outlets would increase their 
coverage by one standard deviation, the EU perfor-
mance evaluation of an average media user is expected 
to increase by .400. Comparing the first and second 
panel we see that, within the variation we find in our 
sample, change in media coverage has a stronger impact 
than change in media use.  
Exposure to EU performance evaluations does not 
seem to affect citizens’ general evaluations of EU perfor-
mance, with (see model 4) or without (see model 3) ex-
posure to EU performance visibility in the model. Adding 
exposure to evaluations to the model does not improve 
the model (comparing model 3 to model 1: χ2(df=1) = 0.237, 
p = .626; comparing model 4 to model 2: χ2(df=1) = 0.002, p 
= .966), nor does evaluation exposure have a significant 
effect (model 3: b = -0.002, se = 0.004, p = .626; model 4: 
b = -0.000, se = 0.004, p = .966). We do see that the effect 
of exposure to EU performance visibility remains signifi-
cant when adding exposure to evaluations to the model, 
and is of comparable size (b = 0.241, se = 0.100, p = .016). 
Thus, respondents are affected by whether the news they 
consume reports about EU performance, but not by ex-
posure to general media evaluations. 
7. Discussion 
Corroborating general and popular impressions, it is 
safe to say that public opinion—including in the Nether-
lands—became more negative towards the EU and Eu-
ropean integration between 2009 and 2013. The de-
crease in support is observed across-the-board (De 
Vreese et al., 2016), but the greatest magnitude is for 
the performance dimension. Turning to the media, the 
analysis of the news coverage suggests that EU topics 
were not highly salient in the news during the six-month 
period though direct comparisons are difficult, since 
from previous research we know most about the final 
weeks before the election (e.g., Schuck et al., 2011). 
Considering the increased stakes of the EP elections in 
2014, it is perhaps surprising that media salience was 
not higher. The elected parliament gained significant in-
fluence, for example in the right to (co-)appoint the 
President of the European Commission. Moreover, the 
Dutch campaign much like the British campaign, was 
characterized by heated debates about the EU that fea-
tured strong Anti-EU parties. Yet, coverage on the EU only 
made up 2% of the coverage in the political section over 
the course of six months, which means that the EU was 
largely invisible to most Dutch citizens in the period lead-
ing up to the elections. In line with previous research we 
find that EU news is either neutral or slightly negative.  
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In terms of development in EU attitudes—as a func-
tion of exposure to news during the period of analysis—
we focused on the performance dimension and, by com-
bining detailed content analysis data with panel survey 
data, found positive effects of exposure to news that 
was less negative (see also de Vreese & Boomgaarden, 
2016). This combination of data and its linkage at the in-
dividual level are among the closed approximations of 
media effects in an observational setting (Slater, 2004, 
2015). Using these detailed exposure measures that al-
low to pinpoint exposure to specific content and identi-
fying effects of this exposure, while simultaneously con-
trolling for all time-invariant factors like general political 
interest, is one advantage of our design.  
Another noteworthy finding of our study is that even 
though coverage about the performance of the EU was 
rather negative, exposure to this coverage has a positive 
effect on attitudes towards the performance of the Eu-
ropean Union. Although this finding seems counter-in-
tuitive, there are two explanations that might explain 
this observation. First, regardless of the evaluation, cov-
erage about the performance of the EU means that me-
dia users are exposed to news items about functioning 
institutions that actively shape policy in the European 
context. In contrast to other news items about the EU 
that cover the EU from a national perspective, news 
items about the performance of the EU portray Euro-
pean institutions as a supra-national actor that has the 
potential to bring about change. This could lead to a 
more positive evaluation of the performance of these 
EU institutions. On a more general level this is an exam-
ple of how seeing the “EU in action” in the news miti-
gates the overall negative developments otherwise 
found in EU attitudes. Second, when comparing the 
evaluation of the different dimensions in the news cov-
erage, it becomes apparent that performance was eval-
uated less negatively than other dimensions. This means 
that the performance of the EU stood out as one of the 
more successful dimensions of the EU in contrast to 
other dimensions. Our results here are only partially in 
line with the work by Desmet et al. (2015) who did find 
effects of evaluative news. They found that when news 
tone converges and creates a one-sided evaluative news 
coverage, whether positive or negative, this affects indi-
vidual EU evaluations. Future research should further 
explicate the conditions under which visibility or evalu-
ations constitute the driving effect.  
We believe that our Dutch case study is an interest-
ing case to learn from because public opinion is variable 
with respect to the EU. More importantly, regardless of 
the absolute level of EU evaluation in a specific case, we 
believe we may draw inferences about the underlying 
dynamics we are studying beyond the Dutch case. 
Taking a step back we believe that our study is in-
formative for research looking at the democratic deficit 
of the EU and current EU developments. In past research 
we have seen how national yardsticks are important for 
evaluating the EU. Desmet et al. (2012) and Hobolt 
(2012) both demonstrated this empirically and cross-na-
tionally. As the EU takes more of a centre stage in poli-
tics—and as citizens in turn become more aware of the 
functioning of the EU and its institutions—the evalua-
tions of the performance of the EU is likely to not only 
carry more weight for general opinions about the EU 
and EU democracy, but perhaps also for domestic poli-
tics and democracy. This dynamic hints at what van der 
Eijk and Franklin (2004) dubbed the ‘sleeping giant’ (see 
also de Vries, 2007) more than a decade ago, referring 
to the potential ability of EU politics to shape national 
politics. Indeed recent evidence (Miklin, 2014) suggests 
that in the wake of the crisis, the saliency of European 
issues has increased (although the incentive structure is 
still such that for mainstream parties it can be more 
functional to suppress EU topics). 
Our study also shows that EU attitudes are quite sub-
ject to change. This may happen during an election cam-
paign or over a longer period of time in response to both 
real world developments and media coverage (see also 
Van Klingeren, Boomgaarden, Vliegenthart, & de 
Vreese, 2015). This is informative as scholarship on EU 
public opinion moves forward: 2014 might have been a 
cross-road election, but much of what shaped the par-
ticular dynamics of that campaign started much earlier.  
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Appendix 
Table A. Reliability scores CA variables. 
 Holsti 
EU visibility 0.92 
EU evaluation 0.61 
EU performance evaluation 0.65 
Note: Reliability scores EU visibility and EU evaluation are based on 16 articles; reliability scores EU performance evalua-
tion is based on 11 articles. 
Table B. Descriptive measures of the control variables. 
    N M SD 
Raw news exposure “In a typical week, how many days do you watch the 
following TV programs/read the following newspapers and magazines or listen to 
the news on the radio/read about politics on the Internet through one of the 
following sources?” 
t = 1 2189 9,56 6,08 
t = 2 1819 9,79 6,02 
t = 3 1537 9,38 6,05 
t = 4 1379 9,30 6,16 
Interest EU: “How interested are you in the following themes? The European 
Union.” 
t = 1 2189 3,38 1,61 
t = 2 1819 3,28 1,57 
t = 3 1537 3,09 1,52 
t = 4 1379 3,04 1,60 
Interest EPE campaign: “Elections for the European Parliament are (/were) held in 
May 2014. How interested are you in these elections?” 
t = 1 2189 3,39 1,72 
t = 2 1819 3,46 1,75 
t = 3 1537 3,32 1,73 
t = 4 1379 3,32 1,87 
IPC politics: “How often do you talk about politics with family, friends, or 
colleagues?” 
t = 1 2189 3,44 1,55 
t = 2 1819 3,61 1,55 
t = 3 1537 2,79 1,37 
t = 4 1379 3,06 1,48 
IPC EU: “How often do you talk about the European Union with family, friends, or 
colleagues?” 
t = 1 2189 2,57 1,42 
t = 2 1819 2,59 1,41 
t = 3 1537 2,18 1,22 
t = 4 1379 2,41 1,36 
 
Table B. Continued. 
  Eigenvalue Cronbach’s alpha n M SD 
Economic evaluations (1-7 scale, high value is 
positive evaluation): 
(1) “Looking at the economic situation in the 
Netherlands, do you think the situation will be 
better or worse twelve months from now?” 
(2) “How about if you think of the European Union, 
do you think that twelve months from now the 
economic situation in the EU will be better or 
worse?” 
(3) “How about your personal situation: Do you 
think that twelve months from now your personal 
economic situation will be better or worse?” 
t = 1 2.24 0.83 2189 3.80 1.05 
t = 2 2.19 0.82 1819 3.94 0.98 
t = 3 2.32 0.85 1537 3.95 1.03 
t = 4 2.31 0.85 1379 3.91 1.03 
Government satisfaction (1-7 scale, high value is 
positive evaluation):  
(1) “The current national government is doing a 
good job.”  
“And how well do you think the government is 
handling the issue of…(2) European integration; (3) 
the economy; (4) the environment; (5) 
immigration. 
t = 1 3.26 0.87 2189 3.17 1.06 
t = 2 3.22 0.86 1819 3.21 1.05 
t = 3 3.42 0.88 1537 3.26 1.10 
t = 4 3.46 0.89 1379 3.25 1.10 
 
